At this moment, more than 30 companies across the globe say they are working on autonomous-vehicle technology. These companies range from computing-technology firms like Apple, Google, and Intel to those usually associated with automobile manufacturing[1] such as BMW, Ford, Honda, and Volvo.[2] Their most optimistic predictions are that in as few as three to five years,[3] fully autonomous vehicles—automobiles without human drivers—will be in regular use on the road. Predictions vary about whether fully autonomous vehicles, Level 5 on the SAE International classification scale for autonomous-vehicle technology[4], will be introduced first. Yet, given the number of companies working to make improvements and the progress already made with Level 4 technology—which marks the stage when vehicles are classified as being capable of safely driving themselves in predictable spaces—it is highly possible that the technology will progress to Level 5 in the near future. Many economists, pundits, and companies are predicting just that. Autonomous-vehicle technology offers a number of positive opportunities. It has the potential to save many lives, limit environmental damage, increase productivity and, as a result, improve living standards across the country if the gains are distributed equally.[5] But the technology also has the potential to cause significant economic hardship for a number of workers, at least in the short term. For those who drive vehicles for a living, the full financial impact of this technological change will depend, in large part, on whether the transition takes a while or occurs relatively quickly. It will also depend heavily on whether the initial technology deployed is fully or partially autonomous. Overall, 2.86 percent of all workers in the United States are employed in driving occupations. Though it is possible that workers displaced by autonomous-vehicle technology may eventually find new jobs at some point, the analysis contained in this paper is focused on the immediate, short-term impact to employment in the transportation sector if a rapid transition to fully autonomous vehicles were to occur. Using data from the 2010 to 2014 merged American Community Survey released by the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper estimates the labor market impact of jobs likely to be lost with a rapid transition to autonomous vehicles. The report finds that certain population groups and areas of the country would be disproportionately affected. Finally, we call for policymakers to take immediate steps to offset the potential for harmful labor disruptions.

Overall, the labor markets are going to adapt to the impact of new technologies and the demand for skills changes to match it. This change was described by one of the participants in the round table of the House as going "from an economy based on knowledge in an economy based on wisdom." Some economic sectors affi Chent a decline in employment, while others experience diffi culty in finding workers with the skills they need for their growth. [googletranslate_en]

At this moment, more than 30 companies across the globe say they are working on autonomous-vehicle technology. These companies range from computing-technology firms like Apple, Google, and Intel to those usually associated with automobile manufacturing[1] such as BMW, Ford, Honda, and Volvo.[2] Their most optimistic predictions are that in as few as three to five years,[3] fully autonomous vehicles—automobiles without human drivers—will be in regular use on the road. Predictions vary about whether fully autonomous vehicles, Level 5 on the SAE International classification scale for autonomous-vehicle technology [4], will be introduced first. Yet, given the number of companies working to make improvements and the progress already made with Level 4 technology—which marks the stage when vehicles are classified as being capable of safely driving themselves in predictable spaces—it is highly possible that the technology will progress to Level 5 in the near future. Many economists, pundits, and companies are predicting just that. Autonomous-vehicle technology offers a number of positive opportunities. It has the potential to save many lives, limit environmental damage, increase productivity and, as a result, improve living standards across the country if the gains are distributed equally.[5] But the technology also has the potential to cause significant economic hardship for a number of workers, at least in the short term. For those who drive vehicles for a living, the full financial impact of this technological change will depend, in large part, on whether the transition takes a while or occurs relatively quickly. It will also depend heavily on whether the initial technology deployed is fully or partially autonomous. Overall, 2.86 percent of all workers in the United States are employed in driving occupations. Though it is possible that workers displaced by autonomous-vehicle technology may eventually find new jobs at some point, the analysis contained in this paper is focused on the immediate, short-term impact to employment in the transportation sector if a rapid transition to fully autonomous vehicles were to occur. Using data from the 2010 to 2014 merged American Community Survey released by the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper estimates the labor market impact of jobs likely to be lost with a rapid transition to autonomous vehicles. The report finds that certain population groups and areas of the country would be disproportionately affected. Finally, we call for policymakers to take immediate steps to offset the potential for harmful labor disruptions.

The European defence industry is a strategic sector of the EU economy, not only because of its contribution to EU security, but also because of its importance in terms of employment, value added and exports, because of its contribution to regional development, and because of its contribution to a number of other industries, notably through innovation. Yet, today, the industry is facing important challenges: like other industrial sectors, the defence industry is required to deliver increased efficiency in order to provide value for money to its customers and, at the same time, protect its shareholders' interests. At the same time, demand is increasingly constrained by national defence budgets, whilst competition is growing at world level. Restructuring has become unavoidable. To minimise the negative consequences of restructuring in the social sphere, anticipation is essential – and in particular anticipation of skills needs.

This sixth report in BCEC’s Focus on the States series looks at the changing nature of employment, the quality of work, and considers the role of technology in the jobs of the future. The report also sheds light on patterns of employment and hours worked across industry sectors and brings empirical evidence to bear on the extent to which our work patterns are likely to evolve into the future. The report highlights the critical imperative to ensure that workers – particularly low-skilled men – can access retraining and education opportunities that smooth their transition to new, higher skilled jobs, or into other forms of employment. Our report develops a unique index of precarious employment for Australia, combining indicators of job insecurity, employment conditions, employment and lack of control of work-life balance. We find that precarious employment has increased for both genders since 2009, but more rapidly for men than women.

The non-constancy of factor shares is raising the attention of many researchers. We contribute to the literature by documenting an average drop of the labour share of 8 percentage points for eight European countries and the US between 1980 and 2007. Speculating on the type of production function, we investigate theoretically and empirically two driving forces: the decline of Information Communication Technology (ICT) investment price and the presence of frictions in the labour market. We find that cheaper ICT equipment is a promising channel to explain the decline of the labour share, given an elasticity of substitution with labour of about 1.17. Finally, by modelling this elasticity as a function of labour market institutions and worker groups, we find that it is strongly positively affected by a decline of routine occupations. An unconventional way to show the job polarization phenomenon.

The historical record and recent research into the economics of machine learning, technology adoption, and the relationship between the diffusion of robotics and employment supports an optimistic case for the future of technology and employment. As technology continues to progress, the lines separating “labor” and “leisure” will get fuzzier. It won’t likely give us good reason to fear that artificial intelligence will reduce people to jobless penury. While new technologies foreclose some opportunities, they create new ones. That has been the case for the last couple of centuries. It is not likely to change substantially.

This report provides an analysis of the labour needs of the manufacturing industry in Canada for the next 5 and 10 years. It develops a baseline projection of the labour requirements of Canadian manufacturing by occupation. The analysis covers the top 15 manufacturing regions across Canada and the main manufacturing sectors in these regions. This is the most comprehensive labour market study at this level of detail (i.e., regional, sectoral, and occupational). The 2016 edition is the second year for this research and analysis. Canada’s manufacturing regions are buffeted by specific and often unique factors. The manufacturers in each region across the country are focused on different industries and a variety of markets. These differences pose distinct challenges. But they also contain common factors and attributes that have been identified through this research and validated through the Regional Industry Committees comprised of local manufacturers in each region.

Over the past few decades, Canada’s labour requirements have changed drastically—from a need for physical labourers to a need for knowledge workers—as a result of changes in economic and social conditions that have included advances in information and communication technologies, globalization of economic activity and shifting demographics. Consequently, employers and firms are increasingly seeking skilled workers with a more sophisticated array of capabilities. Of recent concern, the current global recession has led to the deterioration of labour-market conditions in Canada and worldwide, profoundly affecting— through increased vulnerability to unemployment—the economic and social well-being of families and communities across Canada. Canada’s economic strength, as in other countries, depends on its ability to develop a skilled and flexible workforce, capable of adapting to continuous change. While Canada’s formal education is of a high standard, it alone cannot provide the conditions needed to secure the development of Canada’s talent—its human infrastructure—which is a necessary element of our country’s future prosperity.