The need to re-balance the economy to secure economic recovery, renewal and growth, in parallel with achieving increased efficiency gains in public spending has been recognised as critical by the UK Commission for Employment and Skills. With eighty per cent of the 2020 workforce already in work, it is clear that: ‘We must fix the ‘stock’ of adult skills as well as the ‘flow’ of young people into the labour market’ (UKCES, 2010, p. 103). What is missing in this analysis of the skills problem, however, is a sense of the progression of individuals through work across the life course, particularly insofar as this involves movement between sectors. As a consequence, the dynamic way in which individuals become engaged with learning and development pathways, which can involve up-skilling, re-skilling and sometimes transformational shifts in perspective as their careers unfold, has remained largely absent from current policy analysis in this area. This study examines the potential of the concept of career adaptability for increasing the quality of careers support services and enabling individuals to become self-sufficient by supporting themselves. Career adaptability could also fit with the goal of enhancing high performance working (Felstead et al., 2011). The inter-relationship between career adaptability and employability is considered alongside relevant policy initiatives that could benefit, potentially, from the adoption of career adaptability both by individuals and organisations. Findings highlight the need for a stronger policy framework that helps motivate and inspire individuals to take action at different ages and stages in the life course (that is, new ways of combining learning, earning and active citizenship). Individuals have a wide range of goals, aspirations, achievements and identities, which emerge in a variety of community contexts, institutions, qualification structures and labour markets. Those who do not engage in substantive up-skilling or re-skilling through either formal learning or learning through work, for periods of five to ten years, run the risk of being 'locked into' a particular way of working. They become more vulnerable in the role of careers adaptability in skills supply in labour market, especially where there is a significant change in their job or their circumstances, because their ability to be adaptable with regard to their career progression can decay. Findings from this study indicate that adopting a competency approach1 What is ‘career adaptability’? to developing career adaptive behaviour could provide a useful framework to promote the need for individuals to adopt certain behaviours to help realise their career aspirations. Additionally, this approach offers a potentially constructive framework for raising awareness of self-defeating behaviours in which some individuals may be inclined to engage.

France has launched since 2013 in the way of the "industry of the future" and following the footsteps of countries such as Germany. Concept blur and abundant, "the industry of the future" is nevertheless become over the months a major focus of the French industrial policy scope as the standard of the French Industrial Renewal. The strong mobilization around the "Industry of the Future" program not only to direct public funding towards the modernization of the industry but also to launch a wide debate on the future of manufacturing in France. [googletranslate_en]

Income inequality in Singapore has risen significantly in the last decade. Whether measured by the Gini coefficient, or by the ratio of incomes between the top and bottom deciles, the evidence points to an incontrovertible fact: Singapore has become more unequal in the last ten years or so. In addition, there are certain characteristics of inequality patterns in Singapore that make it especially worrying.

This paper investigates basic relationships between technology and occupations. Building a general occupational model, I look at detailed occupations since 1980 to explore whether computers are related to job losses or other sources of wage inequality. Occupations that use computers grow faster, not slower. This is true even for highly routine and mid-wage occupations. Estimates reject computers as a source of significant net technological unemployment or job polarization. But computerized occupations substitute for other occupations, shifting employment and requiring new skills. Because new skills are costly to learn, computer use is associated with substantially greater within-occupation wage inequality.

Putting the client first, Industry 4.0 guarantees better products, more efficient production methods and bespoke industrial services. The comprehensive interconnection of processes in production, logistics and services is a huge issue at practically every large manufacturer in Europe. In the US and Asia, too, it is the definitive changing force of the era. Cyber-physical systems might form the basis of the next industrial revolution. Its influence is trickling down through every sector of industry and the wider economy. Industry 4. is already changing the landscape of competition with far-reaching consequences for the workforce and infrastructure as a whole. In a nutshell, Industry 4.0 is nothing more than a fully integrated, value creation system – with huge impact on Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) for both industry and nation states. For the first time such concepts as cyber security, big data and advanced manufacturing can all be brought under one virtual roof to satisfy the mass customization demands of society, reap the benefits of the internet revolution and perhaps most importantly finally begin to take the word sustainability seriously and treat resources with more respect. The path ahead however is littered with obstacles and achieving this land of digital milk and honey will be anything but easy. Lot-size-one production at cost of mass products will change consumer behaviour.

In tandem with the diffusion of computer technologies, labour markets across the OECD have undergone rapid structural transformation. In this paper, we examine i) the impact of technological change on labour market outcomes since the computer revolution of the 1980s, and ii) recent developments in digital technology – including machine learning and robotics – and their potential impacts on the future of work. While it is evident that the composition of the workforce has shifted dramatically over recent decades, in part as a result of technological change, the impacts of digitalisation on the future of jobs are far from certain. On the one hand, accumulating anecdotal evidence shows that the potential scope of automation has expanded beyond routine work, making technological change potentially increasingly labour-saving: according to recent estimates 47 percent of US jobs are susceptible to automation over the forthcoming decades. On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that digital technologies have not created many new jobs to replace old ones: an upper bound estimate is that around 0.5 percent of the US workforce is employed in digital industries that emerged throughout the 2000s. Nevertheless, at first approximation, there is no evidence to suggest that the computer revolution so far has reduced overall demand for jobs as technologically stagnant sectors of the economy – including health care, government and personal services – continue to create vast employment opportunities. Looking forward, however, we argue that as the potential scope of automation is expanding, many sectors that have been technologically stagnant in the past are likely to become technologically progressive in the future. While we should expect a future surge in productivity as a result, the question of whether gains from increases in productivity will be widely shared depends on policy responses.

The Canadian labour market suffered a severe blow during the last recession, with more than 430,000 persons losing their jobs and the unemployment rate reaching levels unseen since the latter half of the 1990s. Subsequently, the labour market has shown great resilience, and there are now 900,000 more Canadians employed since the beginning of the recovery. Important weaknesses remain, however: long-term and youth unemployment still stand at obstinately high levels – despite a recent growth in job vacancies. This E-Brief argues the best way to further support the Canadian labour market would be through policies that enhance labour mobility and emphasize skills training to help ensure unemployed Canadians have the right skill sets to integrate into the workforce.

This project examined how external factors have changed the way companies interact with their workforce. It also examined models of the workplace of the past and the workplace of today to better illustrate the impact of market forces on both the employers and employees. Lastly, it proposes a new model in which employers can work more deliberately and strategically to employ a more satisfied, engaged and productive workforce, and to ultimately compete in today's unforgiving marketplace.

This note focuses on the duration of growth spells—defined as the interval starting with a growth upbreak and ending with a downbreak—and on the links between duration and various policies and country characteristics, including income distribution. It turns out that many of even the poorest countries have succeeded in initiating growth at high rates for a few years. What is rarer—and what separates growth miracles from laggards—is the ability to sustain growth. The question then becomes: what determines the length of growth spells, and what is the role of income inequality in duration?