This article examines the effects of discrimination based on race, ethnic background, nationality, religion, sex, age, disability and sexual orientation on skill underutilization and under-skilling in 30 European countries. People who experienced a variety of forms of workplace discrimination were more likely to report over-skilling, defined as having skills for more demanding roles than required for their job. Paradoxically, some forms of labour market discrimination were also linked to under-skilling, where people report requiring more training to fulfil their job role. The findings are explained in terms of how discrimination in the labour market can have differential impacts on access to career progression and training opportunities across organizations. Differences between self-report and statistical estimates of discrimination are observed. Broader implications for the interpretation of statistical models in discrimination research are discussed.

We construct an applied general equilibrium model to account for diverging patterns of the skill premium. Our framework assesses the roles of various factors that affect the demand and supply of skilled and unskilled labor—shifts in the skill composition of the labor supply, changes in the terms of trade and the complementarity between skilled labor and equipment capital in production. We find that increases in relative skilled labor supply due to demographic changes lead to a decline in the skill premium, while equipment capital deepening raises the relative demand for skilled labor, which in turn increases the skill premium. In addition, terms of trade changes lead to the reallocation of resources toward sectors in which countries enjoy comparative advantages. Since our model incorporates multiple factors simultaneously, it can generate either rising or falling skill premium paths. When we parametrize the model to the Baltic states—countries that were similar along many dimensions at the onset of their transition from centrally planned to market-oriented economies—our model can closely account for the diverging patterns of skill premia observed in the Baltics between 1995 and 2008.

Previous research examining skill mismatch in the labour market has ignored potential implications for workers outside of the work environment. We argue that the psychological strain that the discrepancy between worker’s skills and job requirements wields on workers spills over into the non-work sphere, increasing work–life conflict. This study explores the consequence of skill mismatch for work–family life and various dimensions of job satisfaction. Using the 2011 British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), we find that both over- and underskilled workers reported lower satisfaction with achievement and autonomy, opportunity for development, and pay and security. Results also suggest that not only does skill mismatch have a negative influence on work–life conflict but that this association is completely mediated through job satisfaction. Given this better understanding of the complex ways that skill mismatch in employment shapes non-work life, implications for employees and firms are discussed.

Recently there has been significant attention given to the fourth industrial revolution and its impact on employment. The present study aims to provide employee insights into their perceptions of the future of work, specifically around their job and career. These insights are important, as the respondents show how they plan to adapt (or more importantly, not plan or not adapt) to new jobs and careers in a rapidly changing world. Based on insights from 60 employees, which were collected online, the key findings suggest that people in the same line of work have varying degrees of knowledge and opinions about automation and how it may impact on their jobs. In addition, many employees are generally optimistic about the future of work and their long-term careers, with them acknowledging potential job changes around automation, but with a strong belief their type of work will remain. These are important findings when we consider how people plan their careers in the face of automation.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to evaluate various ways in which soft skills can be developed. It proposes a self-facilitation framework to develop and enhance soft skills. Design/methodology/approach: A survey questionnaire was developed based on a pilot study with reference to key components of an individual's life which can be instrumental in developing soft skills. Study was conducted on participants of Management Development Program (MDP) in a business school in India between June 2017 and March 2018. Participants who had attended a session on soft skills were selected for the study. In all, 180 participants from 12 programs filled the responses based on a five-point Likert scale. Of all, 167 responses were complete and deemed fit for analysis. Factor analysis using SPSS 22 resulted in five factors, namely, family, self, industry, academia, and resources. Findings: Findings indicated that irrespective of gender, age categories, type of organizations working in, and the years of work experience, majority respondents accepted that soft skills could be developed through a holistic approach with the help of a self-facilitation framework (FSIAR) comprising family, self, industry, academia, and resources., Research limitations/implications: The framework can be generalized by testing the questions with a larger number of respondents. A further research could be to delve into the cultural factors while using this framework in various countries. Practical implications: The study is extremely beneficial for heads of organizations, working executives, educational institutions, scholars, faculty, and trainers. Originality/value: This study for the first time has proposed a self-facilitation framework - FSIAR for developing and enhancing soft skills of an individual.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to review three international frameworks, including the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), in relation to one country's higher professional and vocational education system. Design/methodology/approach: The frameworks were examined in the context of English higher work-related education, and areas of mismatch identified. These were investigated to identify the extent to which they were due to weaknesses in the national system or to limiting assumptions contained in the frameworks. Findings: Assumptions based on stages of education are problematic in the context of lifelong higher and professional education, while more open, lifelong-learning oriented assumptions can be too skeletal to aid comparisons between systems of initial vocational education and training. Particular problems are identified with assumptions contained in the ISCED that do not reflect the reality of professional education., Practical implications: International frameworks need to take account of patterns of learning that take place outside of formal institutions and throughout life, but which lead to equivalent outcomes. Nevertheless, it is not adequate to substitute assumptions based only on the level of achievement. Social implications: The assumptions underpinning the ISCED in particular mean that equivalent achievements in different systems can be classified differently, leading to under-reporting of individual achievements, a lack of comparability in international statistics, and potential for policy distortion. Originality/value: The paper builds on the work of Hippach-Schneider et al. by providing additional evidence, from a different national context, for issues relating to the ISCED in the context of higher professional and vocational education, and extends this analysis to the two major European frameworks.

Despite the ubiquity of staff soft skills programmes, few studies have examined why and how academic and corporate services staff utilise these programmes for self-care/governance. This study reports on findings from an ethnography of soft skills learning and development programmes (LDPs) in a UK university, focusing on interviews with programme participants and facilitators. Results suggest that, as social worlds with neoliberal directives, LDPs promote various self-governance activities in the form of entrepreneurism and novel, corporate versions of self-care. Time on LDPs was seen as a chance to, 'put oneself first', examine career options and cultivate sought-after attributes, including self-confidence and assertiveness. Social networking and performance management also emerged as significant issues. Career development was important for all participants; however, perceptions of how to realise this differed. Based on our findings, we propose three types of work-related performance - 'career nomad', 'reluctant entrepreneur', and 'course hopper' - constituting a typology for understanding social worlds inhabited by contemporary university professionals. Our study suggests that self-care 'technologies' have multiple, competing functions in continuing professional education. While LDPs can help professionals navigate paths through increasingly challenging organisations, their entrepreneurial ethos and content reflect the market interests they serve.

A recurring question in public and scientific debates is whether occupation-specific skills enhance labor market outcomes. Is it beneficial to have an educational degree that is linked to only one or a small set of occupations? To answer this question, we generalize existing models of the effects of (mis)match between education and occupation on labor market outcomes. Specifically, we incorporate the structural effects of linkage strength between school and work, which vary considerably across industrialized countries. In an analysis of France, Germany, and the United States, we find that workers have higher earnings when they are in occupations that match their educational level and field of study, but the size of this earnings boost depends on the clarity and strength of the pathway between their educational credential and the labor market. The earnings premium associated with a good occupational match is larger in countries where the credential has a stronger link to the labor market, but the penalty for a mismatch is also greater in such countries. Moreover, strong linkage reduces unemployment risk. These findings add nuance to often-made arguments that countries with loosely structured educational systems have more flexible labor markets and produce better labor market outcomes for workers. An institutional environment that promotes strong school-to-work pathways appears to be an effective strategy for providing workers with secure, well-paying jobs.

Robotics and the automation of knowledge work, often referred to as AI (artificial intelligence), are presented in the media as likely to have massive impacts, for better or worse, on jobs skills, organizations and society. The article deconstructs the dominant hype-and-fear narrative. Claims on net job loss emerge as exaggerated, but there will be considerable skills disruption and change in the major global economies over the next 12 years. The term AI has been hijacked, in order to suggest much more going on technologically than can be the case. The article reviews critically the research evidence so far, including the author’s own, pointing to eight major qualifiers to the dominant discourse of major net job loss from a seamless, overwhelming AI wave sweeping fast through the major economies. The article questions many assumptions: that automation creates few jobs short or long term; that whole jobs can be automated; that the technology is perfectible; that organizations can seamlessly and quickly deploy AI; that humans are machines that can be replicated; and that it is politically, socially and economically feasible to apply these technologies. A major omission in all studies is factoring in dramatic increases in the amount of work to be done. Adding in ageing populations, productivity gaps and skills shortages predicted across many G20 countries, the danger might be too little, rather than too much labour. The article concludes that, if there is going to be a Robo-Apocalypse, this will be from a collective failure to adjust to skills change over the next 12 years. But the debate needs to be widened to the impact of eight other technologies that AI insufficiently represents in the popular imagination and that, in combination, could cause a techno-apocalypse.