Every day, Canadians make choices that affect their careers and lives, and businesses make choices that affect their organizations. Accurate, timely and relevant information is needed to ensure these decisions are well informed. However, recent developments (including technological change) have created information gaps in the area of skills and skill requirements for jobs. Even the skill requirements for many traditional jobs are changing and employers report challenges in finding workers with the right skills to fill vacancies—in industries old and new. Similarly, workers struggle to understand the changing skills needed for jobs and often lack the tools and knowledge to meet these new requirements. How do workers and employers make sense of this labour market, which is increasingly driven by supply-and-demand of skills as opposed to the qualifications of graduates?

The world cannot wait for the fog of geopolitical and geo-economic uncertainty to lift. Opting to ride out the current period in the hope that the global system will œsnap back runs the risk of missing crucial windows to address pressing challenges. On key issues such as the economy, the environment, technology and public health, stakeholders must find ways to act quickly and with purpose within an unsettled global landscape. This is the context in which the World Economic Forum publishes the 15th edition of the Global Risks Report.

Discussions of Canada's so-called œskills gap have reached a fever pitch. Driven by conflicting reports and data, the conversation shows no signs of abating. On the one hand, economic indicators commonly used to identify gaps point to problems limited to only certain occupations (like health occupations) and certain provinces (like Alberta) rather than to a general skills crisis. On the other hand, employers continue to report a mismatch between the skills they need in their workplaces and those possessed by job seekers, and to voice concern that the postsecondary system is not graduating students with the skills they need. This paper is the first of three on Canada's skills gap. It outlines the conflicting views around the existence and extent of a divide between the skills postsecondary graduate possess and those employers want. In laying out the competing perspectives on this issue, the report identifies four distinct themes that have been conflated in policy debates, in turn hindering efforts to gain a clearer understanding of the skills gap in Canada. For example, in the eyes of some employers and commentators, the skills gap problem is one of too few high-skilled workers in the Canadian labour market. For others, it is a problem of weak essential or soft skills, such as working with others, oral communication and problem solving. Still others use the term œskills gap to refer to what might better be described as an œexperience gap - a shortage of œwork-ready employees possessing those skills that are acquired through work experience. Commentary on the skills gap has tended to lump these different perspectives together and this has acted as an obstacle to a coherent narrative around skills in Canada. This report suggests that these themes should be recognized as distinct from one another. By framing Canada's skills gap in this way, we set the stage for the second and third papers of this series, which document the expectations of Canadian employers with regard to the skill levels of new graduate hires. In tackling the question of the skills gap at its interface - the initial point of contact between employers and new graduates in the advertisements and hiring processes for entry-level jobs - reports in this series provide new opportunities for groups on both the demand (employers) and supply (postsecondary) sides of the skills gap debate to strengthen alignment between the postsecondary sector and the Canadian labour market.

The year-of-landing appears to predict the level and trajectory of median wage and salary (W&S) earnings of immigrants to Canada: For immigrants who arrived in the 1990 to 2010 period, W&S earnings are similar in the first year of participation in the Canadian labour market (ranging between $18,000 and $24,000 in constant $2012); ï‚· For each year-of-landing cohort, the median W&S earnings increase in real terms due, at least in part, to productivity growth attributable to labour market experience in Canada; and ï‚· Median W&S earnings of a given year-of-landing cohort seldom catch up to the median W&S earnings of an earlier cohort.

Canada's population is increasingly racialized. The 2016 census counted 7.7 million racialized individuals in Canada. That number represented 22% of the population, up sharply from 16% just a decade earlier. Unfortunately, the rapid growth in the racialized population is not being matched by a corresponding increase in economic equality. This paper uses 2016 census data to paint a portrait of income inequality between racialized and non-racialized Canadians. It also looks at the labour market discrimination faced by racialized workers in 2006 and 2016. Racialized workers are more likely to be active in the workforce than non-racialized workers, either working or trying to find work, but this does not result in better employment outcomes for them. From 2006 to 2016, there was little change to the patterns of employment and earnings inequality along racial and gender lines in Canada. Overall in 2016, the racialized population had an unemployment rate of 9.2% compared to the non-racialized rate of 7.3%. Racialized women had the highest unemployment rate at 9.6%, followed by racialized men at 8.8%, non-racialized men at 8.2%, and non-racialized women at 6.4%. In 2015, racialized men earned 78 cents for every dollar that non-racialized men earned. This earnings gap remained unchanged since 2005.Labour market discrimination continues to be gendered and racialized. Racialized women earned 59 cents for every dollar that non-racialized men earned, while non-racialized women earned 67 cents for every dollar that non-racialized men earned. Little progress was made in reducing this gap over the 10-year period. This paper also looked at differences in income from wealth between the racialized and non-racialized population. The racialized gap in capital gains is clear: 8.3% of the racialized population over the age of 15 reported capital gains, compared to 11.9% of the non-racialized population. And the average amount of capital gains of non-racialized Canadians ($13,974) is 29% higher than the average amount for racialized Canadians ($10,828). Investment income shows a similar pattern: 25.1% of the racialized population over the age of 15 reported investment income, compared to 30.8% of the non-racialized population. The average investment income for the non-racialized population ($11,428) is 47% higher than the average for the racialized population ($7,774). These data provide a glimpse of the likely differences in wealth between racialized and non-racialized Canadians. These aspects of income inequality, from both employment and wealth, are also visible in the inequality in family incomes. The data show that racialized individuals are more likely to be in families in the bottom half of the income distribution (60%) than non-racialized individuals are (47%). This paper also explores the relationship between race, immigration and employment incomes. We saw that non-racialized immigrants do better in the Canadian labour market, and do better sooner, than racialized immigrants do. Moreover, income inequality between racialized and non-racialized Canadians extends to the second and third generations--and beyond. Clearly, immigration is not the only issue. Among prime-age (25-54 years old) workers, racialized immigrant men earned 71 cents for every dollar that non-racialized immigrant men earned. Racialized immigrant women earned 79 cents for every dollar that non-racialized immigrant women earned. These gaps continue into the second generation and beyond. Second-generation racialized men earned 79 cents for every dollar that second-generation non-racialized men earned. Second-generation racialized women earned 96 cents for every dollar that second-generation non-racialized women earned. Our analysis also illustrates the importance of understanding the distinct barriers in the labour market faced by different racialized groups. Both menand women who identified as Black had higher labour force participation rates than their non-racialized counterparts. However, they also had higher unemployment rates and bigger wage gaps than the average for all racialized workers. Men who identified as Filipino had much lower unemployment rates than the average for racialized workers and yet had a larger earnings gap, while women who identified as Filipino had lower unemployment rates and a smaller earnings gap than the racialized average. Addressing the labour market discrimination faced by racialized workers will require a deeper understanding of racism and the different ways it is manifested in the labour market. That understanding needs to be used to shape policy. Taken together, the data point to an unequivocal pattern of racialized economic inequality in Canada. In the absence of bold policies to combat racism, this economic inequality shows no signs of disappearing.

In this paper, we present a portrait of Ontario's colour-coded labour market as of 2016 (the latest data available) and compare it to how things looked in 2006. Overall, there were 3.9 million racialized individuals living in Ontario in 2016, representing 29% of Ontario's population--a notable increase from 23% of the population in 2006. Racialized workers in Ontario had a slightly higher labour force participation rate than non-racialized workers (65.3% versus 64.5%) in 2016. However, racialized Ontarians continued to experience higher unemployment rates. Racialized women had the highest unemployment rate at 10%, followed by racialized men at 8.7%, non-racialized men at 7%, and non-racialized women at 6.3%. An occupational breakdown of the workforce sheds light on the gendered and racialized gap in the labour market. Racialized women were most likely to be in the lowest-paying occupations. The share of racialized women (25.1%) working in occupations that fall in the bottom 10% of average earnings was 66% higher than the share of non-racialized men (15%). Non-racialized women were slightly less likely to work in these low-wage occupations than racialized women (23.6%). The share of racialized men in these lowest-paying occupations (17.8%) was higher than the share of non-racialized men (15.1%).These patterns are reversed for occupations that pay in the highest 10% of average earnings: 11% of non-racialized men worked in these highest-paying occupations, followed by 8.8% of racialized men, 5.7% of non-racialized women, and 5.5% of racialized women. In short, the racialized gap can be found at both the bottom and the top of the occupational distribution. These labour market experiences contribute to the persistent wage gap: In 2015, racialized men earned 76 cents for every dollar non-racialized men earned. Racialized women earned 85 cents for every dollar non-racialized women earned. These earnings gaps have remained virtually unchanged since 2006. Labour market discrimination remains gendered and racialized: racialized women earned 58 cents for every dollar non-racialized men earned. There has been little progress in closing the earnings gap between men and women. Non-racialized women earned 69 cents for every dollar non-racialized men earned. Racialized women earned 77 cents for every dollar racialized men earned. We also explore the notion that racialized workers fare worse in the job market because many of them are immigrants, and all immigrants struggle before landing a good job. Our findings demonstrate that not all immigrants have the same experience. Among prime-age (25-54 years old) workers, racialized male immigrants earned 70 cents for every dollar non-racialized male immigrants earned. Racialized female immigrants earned 78 cents for every dollar that non-racialized female immigrants earned. These gaps continue into the second generation and beyond. Second-generation racialized men earned 78 cents for every dollar second-generation non-racialized men earned. Second-generation racialized women earned 64 cents for every dollar second-generation nonracialized men earned. These findings point to the need for Ontario to deal with the uncomfortable truth that its labour market is not equally welcoming to all immigrants. They also indicate that differences in immigrants' outcomes are not based only on education levels and language skills, but also on racialization. The data also illustrate the importance of understanding the distinct barriers in the labour market faced by different racialized groups. There aremany examples that illustrate these differences. Both men and women who identified as Black had higher labour force participation rates than their non-racialized counterparts. However, they also had higher unemployment rates and bigger wage gaps than the average for all racialized workers. Men who identified as Filipino had much lower unemployment rates than nonracialized workers and yet had a larger earnings gap; while women who identified as Filipino had lower unemployment rates and a smaller earnings gap than the racialized average. Men and women who identified as Latin American had lower unemployment rates and larger earnings gaps than the average for all racialized workers. Addressing the labour market discrimination faced by racialized workers will require a deeper understanding of racism and the different ways it is manifested in the labour market for different racialized groups. That understanding needs to be used to shape policy to address these different barriers and forms of discrimination. The bottom line: we are still waiting for bold new policies to close the persistent gap between racialized and non-racialized men and women in Ontario. Until we tackle the barriers to employment equity and to decent work, Ontario's racialized income gap is unlikely to go away

This report presents the first indepth snapshot of both workers and consumers who identify themselves as participating in the œsharing economy in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). It also looks at who is providing services within this sector, the conditions of their work, and public perceptions of the need to change regulations to keep up with this new sector.

The last available cencus data before the federal government cancelled the country's mandatory long form Census reveals a troubling trend in Canada. Despite years of unprecedented economic growth and an increasingly diverse population, this report confirms what so many Canadians have experienced in real life: a colour code is still at work in Canada's labour market. Racialized1 Canadians encounter a persistent colour code that blocks them from the best paying jobs our country has to offer. This report uses the 2006 long form Census data to compare work and income trends among racialized and non-racialized Canadians during the heyday of the economic boom. It finds that even in the best of economic times, the pay gap between racialized and non-racialized Canadians is large: Racialized Canadians earn only 81.4 cents for every dollar paid to non-racialized Canadians. The income gap stems from disparities in the distribution of good paying, more secure jobs. The data show racialized Canadians have slightly higher levels of labour market participation, yet they continue to experience higher levels of unemployment and earn less income than non-racialized Canadians. The work they're able to attain is much more likely to be insecure, temporary, and low paying. For example, this report shows that racialized Canadians are over-represented in a range of traditionally low-paid business services ranging from call centres to security services to janitorial services, while non-racialized Canadians are not.The data show that if there is work to do, racialized Canadians are willing to do it: 67.3% of racialized Canadians are in the labour force--slightly higher than nonracialized Canadians (66.7%). Though they're more willing to work, all racialized groups--except those who identify as Japanese and Filipino--tend to find themselves on the unemployment line more often than non-racialized Canadians. Racialized men are 24% more likely to be unemployed than non-racialized men. Racialized women have it worse: They're 48% more likely to be unemployed than non-racialized men. This may contribute to the fact that racialized women earn 55.6% of the income of non-racialized men. The Census data makes clear: Between 2000 and 2005, during the one of the best economic growth periods for Canada, racialized workers contributed to that economic growth but they didn't enjoy the benefits. On average, non-racialized Canadian earnings grew marginally (2.7%) during this period--tepid income gains considering the economy grew by 13.1%. But the average income of racialized Canadians declined by 0.2%. And this was before recession hit Canada in 2008. The findings raise troubling questions about one of the fastest growing groups in Canadian society. The demographic composition of Canada is quickly changing, but labour market policies are lagging. In the 1980s, racialized groups accounted for less than 5% of Canada's population. By the 2001 Census, racialized Canadians made up 13.4% of the population. Between the 2001 and 2006 Census taking, that population had grown by 27%--five times faster than the rate of growth for the broader Canadian population. In 2006, 16.2% of the population came from a racialized group. By 2031, it's estimated racialized Canadians will make up 32% of the population. The country's demographic composition is undergoing major transformation. If the labour market continues to relegate workers from racialized groups to the back of the pack, the number of Canadians left behind will only accelerate--calling into question the promise that Canada is a fair and caring society committed to equal opportunities, no matter who you are and where you come from. Default explanations like œit takes a while for immigrants to integrate don't bear out. Even when you control for age and education, the data show first generation racialized Canadian men earn only 68.7% of what non-racialized first-generation Canadian men earn, indicating a colour code is firmly at play in the labour market. Here, the gender gap--at play throughout the spectrum--becomes disturbingly large: Racialized women immigrants earn only 48.7 cents for every dollar non-racialized male immigrants earn. The colour code persists for second generation Canadians with similar education and age. The gap narrows, with racialized women making 56.5 cents per dollar non-racialized men earn; while racialized men earn 75.6 cents for every dollar nonracialized men in this cohort earn. While noting many similarities across different racialized groups, the report also highlights some differences. For example, the gap in earnings ranges from 69.5cents per dollar for those who identify as Korean to 89 cents per dollar for those who identify as Chinese. This report captures the ongoing racialization of poverty in Canada. Poverty rates for racialized families are three times higher than non-racialized families. In 2005, 19.8% of racialized families lived in poverty, compared to 6.4% of non-racialized families. Finally, the report makes the links between low-income jobs, the racialization of poverty, and the impacts both have on the health of racialized Canadians.

This report explains why Canada needs to treat international learning as a national priority and sketches out the elements of a Canadian strategy. Section 2, Why Global Education Matters — Now More than Ever, highlights the importance of outbound student mobility in a rapidly changing world. Section 3, Canada — Stuck in Neutral While Others Race Ahead, looks at what other countries are doing and shows how Canada is falling short. Section 4, A Global Education Strategy for Canada, suggests elements of a Canadian strategy based on the Study Group’s key findings from Canadian and other countries’ experiences. Section 5, Taking Action: A Pan-Canadian Approach, outlines what government, educational institutions, the private sector and other stakeholders must do to put the strategy into effect. A summary of recommendations is provided at the end.