White Paper

The rapid development of digital technologies is associated with a new industrial revolution affecting the economic sphere, political and cultural. The digital economy today represents a key driver of growth, productivity and competitiveness for businesses. It is causing new innovative sectors and transformed many traditional sectors whose impact goes far beyond the information and communications technology (ICT). Digital certainly has its challenges, but it also offers unique opportunities for companies. These can store and process large amounts of data through different tools, increase their ability to innovate, develop high value-added products and access new business opportunities. Digital technologies contribute to the creation and communication of ideas that lead to new concepts and innovative applications. Thus emerges a new generation of entrepreneurs. To be able to make our own in this new economic reality, Québec companies must be able to rely on adequate levers. The Chamber believes that the future digital strategy should aim to establish the necessary bases for the development of these levers. [googletranslate_en]

Montreal hosts a veritable ecosystem of individuals, businesses, funders and partners feed each other and work together to create a single territory for the development of creative industries. At the center of this ecosystem is the talent or the raw material needed for the design, production, distribution and dissemination of content and creative products. These are the artists, craftsmen and other artists working in the creative industry, in companies or as self-employed. [googletranslate_en]

To develop and grow, businesses must have access to a workforce appropriate to their needs. Various factors, including new technologies and the aging of the population, influencing the business environment. Here we draw a picture of the situation and possibilities of the metropolis. Our goal is to provide a common tool for analyzing the various socioeconomic stakeholders to enable them to fill the jobs of tomorrow. [googletranslate_en]

At this moment, more than 30 companies across the globe say they are working on autonomous-vehicle technology. These companies range from computing-technology firms like Apple, Google, and Intel to those usually associated with automobile manufacturing[1] such as BMW, Ford, Honda, and Volvo.[2] Their most optimistic predictions are that in as few as three to five years,[3] fully autonomous vehicles—automobiles without human drivers—will be in regular use on the road. Predictions vary about whether fully autonomous vehicles, Level 5 on the SAE International classification scale for autonomous-vehicle technology[4], will be introduced first. Yet, given the number of companies working to make improvements and the progress already made with Level 4 technology—which marks the stage when vehicles are classified as being capable of safely driving themselves in predictable spaces—it is highly possible that the technology will progress to Level 5 in the near future. Many economists, pundits, and companies are predicting just that. Autonomous-vehicle technology offers a number of positive opportunities. It has the potential to save many lives, limit environmental damage, increase productivity and, as a result, improve living standards across the country if the gains are distributed equally.[5] But the technology also has the potential to cause significant economic hardship for a number of workers, at least in the short term. For those who drive vehicles for a living, the full financial impact of this technological change will depend, in large part, on whether the transition takes a while or occurs relatively quickly. It will also depend heavily on whether the initial technology deployed is fully or partially autonomous. Overall, 2.86 percent of all workers in the United States are employed in driving occupations. Though it is possible that workers displaced by autonomous-vehicle technology may eventually find new jobs at some point, the analysis contained in this paper is focused on the immediate, short-term impact to employment in the transportation sector if a rapid transition to fully autonomous vehicles were to occur. Using data from the 2010 to 2014 merged American Community Survey released by the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper estimates the labor market impact of jobs likely to be lost with a rapid transition to autonomous vehicles. The report finds that certain population groups and areas of the country would be disproportionately affected. Finally, we call for policymakers to take immediate steps to offset the potential for harmful labor disruptions.

Overall, the labor markets are going to adapt to the impact of new technologies and the demand for skills changes to match it. This change was described by one of the participants in the round table of the House as going "from an economy based on knowledge in an economy based on wisdom." Some economic sectors affi Chent a decline in employment, while others experience diffi culty in finding workers with the skills they need for their growth. [googletranslate_en]

At this moment, more than 30 companies across the globe say they are working on autonomous-vehicle technology. These companies range from computing-technology firms like Apple, Google, and Intel to those usually associated with automobile manufacturing[1] such as BMW, Ford, Honda, and Volvo.[2] Their most optimistic predictions are that in as few as three to five years,[3] fully autonomous vehicles—automobiles without human drivers—will be in regular use on the road. Predictions vary about whether fully autonomous vehicles, Level 5 on the SAE International classification scale for autonomous-vehicle technology [4], will be introduced first. Yet, given the number of companies working to make improvements and the progress already made with Level 4 technology—which marks the stage when vehicles are classified as being capable of safely driving themselves in predictable spaces—it is highly possible that the technology will progress to Level 5 in the near future. Many economists, pundits, and companies are predicting just that. Autonomous-vehicle technology offers a number of positive opportunities. It has the potential to save many lives, limit environmental damage, increase productivity and, as a result, improve living standards across the country if the gains are distributed equally.[5] But the technology also has the potential to cause significant economic hardship for a number of workers, at least in the short term. For those who drive vehicles for a living, the full financial impact of this technological change will depend, in large part, on whether the transition takes a while or occurs relatively quickly. It will also depend heavily on whether the initial technology deployed is fully or partially autonomous. Overall, 2.86 percent of all workers in the United States are employed in driving occupations. Though it is possible that workers displaced by autonomous-vehicle technology may eventually find new jobs at some point, the analysis contained in this paper is focused on the immediate, short-term impact to employment in the transportation sector if a rapid transition to fully autonomous vehicles were to occur. Using data from the 2010 to 2014 merged American Community Survey released by the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper estimates the labor market impact of jobs likely to be lost with a rapid transition to autonomous vehicles. The report finds that certain population groups and areas of the country would be disproportionately affected. Finally, we call for policymakers to take immediate steps to offset the potential for harmful labor disruptions.

The European defence industry is a strategic sector of the EU economy, not only because of its contribution to EU security, but also because of its importance in terms of employment, value added and exports, because of its contribution to regional development, and because of its contribution to a number of other industries, notably through innovation. Yet, today, the industry is facing important challenges: like other industrial sectors, the defence industry is required to deliver increased efficiency in order to provide value for money to its customers and, at the same time, protect its shareholders' interests. At the same time, demand is increasingly constrained by national defence budgets, whilst competition is growing at world level. Restructuring has become unavoidable. To minimise the negative consequences of restructuring in the social sphere, anticipation is essential – and in particular anticipation of skills needs.

This sixth report in BCEC’s Focus on the States series looks at the changing nature of employment, the quality of work, and considers the role of technology in the jobs of the future. The report also sheds light on patterns of employment and hours worked across industry sectors and brings empirical evidence to bear on the extent to which our work patterns are likely to evolve into the future. The report highlights the critical imperative to ensure that workers – particularly low-skilled men – can access retraining and education opportunities that smooth their transition to new, higher skilled jobs, or into other forms of employment. Our report develops a unique index of precarious employment for Australia, combining indicators of job insecurity, employment conditions, employment and lack of control of work-life balance. We find that precarious employment has increased for both genders since 2009, but more rapidly for men than women.

The non-constancy of factor shares is raising the attention of many researchers. We contribute to the literature by documenting an average drop of the labour share of 8 percentage points for eight European countries and the US between 1980 and 2007. Speculating on the type of production function, we investigate theoretically and empirically two driving forces: the decline of Information Communication Technology (ICT) investment price and the presence of frictions in the labour market. We find that cheaper ICT equipment is a promising channel to explain the decline of the labour share, given an elasticity of substitution with labour of about 1.17. Finally, by modelling this elasticity as a function of labour market institutions and worker groups, we find that it is strongly positively affected by a decline of routine occupations. An unconventional way to show the job polarization phenomenon.