White Paper

In this paper, we present a portrait of Ontario's colour-coded labour market as of 2016 (the latest data available) and compare it to how things looked in 2006. Overall, there were 3.9 million racialized individuals living in Ontario in 2016, representing 29% of Ontario's population--a notable increase from 23% of the population in 2006. Racialized workers in Ontario had a slightly higher labour force participation rate than non-racialized workers (65.3% versus 64.5%) in 2016. However, racialized Ontarians continued to experience higher unemployment rates. Racialized women had the highest unemployment rate at 10%, followed by racialized men at 8.7%, non-racialized men at 7%, and non-racialized women at 6.3%. An occupational breakdown of the workforce sheds light on the gendered and racialized gap in the labour market. Racialized women were most likely to be in the lowest-paying occupations. The share of racialized women (25.1%) working in occupations that fall in the bottom 10% of average earnings was 66% higher than the share of non-racialized men (15%). Non-racialized women were slightly less likely to work in these low-wage occupations than racialized women (23.6%). The share of racialized men in these lowest-paying occupations (17.8%) was higher than the share of non-racialized men (15.1%).These patterns are reversed for occupations that pay in the highest 10% of average earnings: 11% of non-racialized men worked in these highest-paying occupations, followed by 8.8% of racialized men, 5.7% of non-racialized women, and 5.5% of racialized women. In short, the racialized gap can be found at both the bottom and the top of the occupational distribution. These labour market experiences contribute to the persistent wage gap: In 2015, racialized men earned 76 cents for every dollar non-racialized men earned. Racialized women earned 85 cents for every dollar non-racialized women earned. These earnings gaps have remained virtually unchanged since 2006. Labour market discrimination remains gendered and racialized: racialized women earned 58 cents for every dollar non-racialized men earned. There has been little progress in closing the earnings gap between men and women. Non-racialized women earned 69 cents for every dollar non-racialized men earned. Racialized women earned 77 cents for every dollar racialized men earned. We also explore the notion that racialized workers fare worse in the job market because many of them are immigrants, and all immigrants struggle before landing a good job. Our findings demonstrate that not all immigrants have the same experience. Among prime-age (25-54 years old) workers, racialized male immigrants earned 70 cents for every dollar non-racialized male immigrants earned. Racialized female immigrants earned 78 cents for every dollar that non-racialized female immigrants earned. These gaps continue into the second generation and beyond. Second-generation racialized men earned 78 cents for every dollar second-generation non-racialized men earned. Second-generation racialized women earned 64 cents for every dollar second-generation nonracialized men earned. These findings point to the need for Ontario to deal with the uncomfortable truth that its labour market is not equally welcoming to all immigrants. They also indicate that differences in immigrants' outcomes are not based only on education levels and language skills, but also on racialization. The data also illustrate the importance of understanding the distinct barriers in the labour market faced by different racialized groups. There aremany examples that illustrate these differences. Both men and women who identified as Black had higher labour force participation rates than their non-racialized counterparts. However, they also had higher unemployment rates and bigger wage gaps than the average for all racialized workers. Men who identified as Filipino had much lower unemployment rates than nonracialized workers and yet had a larger earnings gap; while women who identified as Filipino had lower unemployment rates and a smaller earnings gap than the racialized average. Men and women who identified as Latin American had lower unemployment rates and larger earnings gaps than the average for all racialized workers. Addressing the labour market discrimination faced by racialized workers will require a deeper understanding of racism and the different ways it is manifested in the labour market for different racialized groups. That understanding needs to be used to shape policy to address these different barriers and forms of discrimination. The bottom line: we are still waiting for bold new policies to close the persistent gap between racialized and non-racialized men and women in Ontario. Until we tackle the barriers to employment equity and to decent work, Ontario's racialized income gap is unlikely to go away

This report presents the first indepth snapshot of both workers and consumers who identify themselves as participating in the œsharing economy in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). It also looks at who is providing services within this sector, the conditions of their work, and public perceptions of the need to change regulations to keep up with this new sector.

The last available cencus data before the federal government cancelled the country's mandatory long form Census reveals a troubling trend in Canada. Despite years of unprecedented economic growth and an increasingly diverse population, this report confirms what so many Canadians have experienced in real life: a colour code is still at work in Canada's labour market. Racialized1 Canadians encounter a persistent colour code that blocks them from the best paying jobs our country has to offer. This report uses the 2006 long form Census data to compare work and income trends among racialized and non-racialized Canadians during the heyday of the economic boom. It finds that even in the best of economic times, the pay gap between racialized and non-racialized Canadians is large: Racialized Canadians earn only 81.4 cents for every dollar paid to non-racialized Canadians. The income gap stems from disparities in the distribution of good paying, more secure jobs. The data show racialized Canadians have slightly higher levels of labour market participation, yet they continue to experience higher levels of unemployment and earn less income than non-racialized Canadians. The work they're able to attain is much more likely to be insecure, temporary, and low paying. For example, this report shows that racialized Canadians are over-represented in a range of traditionally low-paid business services ranging from call centres to security services to janitorial services, while non-racialized Canadians are not.The data show that if there is work to do, racialized Canadians are willing to do it: 67.3% of racialized Canadians are in the labour force--slightly higher than nonracialized Canadians (66.7%). Though they're more willing to work, all racialized groups--except those who identify as Japanese and Filipino--tend to find themselves on the unemployment line more often than non-racialized Canadians. Racialized men are 24% more likely to be unemployed than non-racialized men. Racialized women have it worse: They're 48% more likely to be unemployed than non-racialized men. This may contribute to the fact that racialized women earn 55.6% of the income of non-racialized men. The Census data makes clear: Between 2000 and 2005, during the one of the best economic growth periods for Canada, racialized workers contributed to that economic growth but they didn't enjoy the benefits. On average, non-racialized Canadian earnings grew marginally (2.7%) during this period--tepid income gains considering the economy grew by 13.1%. But the average income of racialized Canadians declined by 0.2%. And this was before recession hit Canada in 2008. The findings raise troubling questions about one of the fastest growing groups in Canadian society. The demographic composition of Canada is quickly changing, but labour market policies are lagging. In the 1980s, racialized groups accounted for less than 5% of Canada's population. By the 2001 Census, racialized Canadians made up 13.4% of the population. Between the 2001 and 2006 Census taking, that population had grown by 27%--five times faster than the rate of growth for the broader Canadian population. In 2006, 16.2% of the population came from a racialized group. By 2031, it's estimated racialized Canadians will make up 32% of the population. The country's demographic composition is undergoing major transformation. If the labour market continues to relegate workers from racialized groups to the back of the pack, the number of Canadians left behind will only accelerate--calling into question the promise that Canada is a fair and caring society committed to equal opportunities, no matter who you are and where you come from. Default explanations like œit takes a while for immigrants to integrate don't bear out. Even when you control for age and education, the data show first generation racialized Canadian men earn only 68.7% of what non-racialized first-generation Canadian men earn, indicating a colour code is firmly at play in the labour market. Here, the gender gap--at play throughout the spectrum--becomes disturbingly large: Racialized women immigrants earn only 48.7 cents for every dollar non-racialized male immigrants earn. The colour code persists for second generation Canadians with similar education and age. The gap narrows, with racialized women making 56.5 cents per dollar non-racialized men earn; while racialized men earn 75.6 cents for every dollar nonracialized men in this cohort earn. While noting many similarities across different racialized groups, the report also highlights some differences. For example, the gap in earnings ranges from 69.5cents per dollar for those who identify as Korean to 89 cents per dollar for those who identify as Chinese. This report captures the ongoing racialization of poverty in Canada. Poverty rates for racialized families are three times higher than non-racialized families. In 2005, 19.8% of racialized families lived in poverty, compared to 6.4% of non-racialized families. Finally, the report makes the links between low-income jobs, the racialization of poverty, and the impacts both have on the health of racialized Canadians.

This report explains why Canada needs to treat international learning as a national priority and sketches out the elements of a Canadian strategy. Section 2, Why Global Education Matters — Now More than Ever, highlights the importance of outbound student mobility in a rapidly changing world. Section 3, Canada — Stuck in Neutral While Others Race Ahead, looks at what other countries are doing and shows how Canada is falling short. Section 4, A Global Education Strategy for Canada, suggests elements of a Canadian strategy based on the Study Group’s key findings from Canadian and other countries’ experiences. Section 5, Taking Action: A Pan-Canadian Approach, outlines what government, educational institutions, the private sector and other stakeholders must do to put the strategy into effect. A summary of recommendations is provided at the end.

Access to post-secondary education matters. This chapter presents data that underpin the importance of widening access to post-secondary education in Canada. It demonstrates that the relationship between em- ployment, earnings and higher education remains clear: post-secondary graduates are more likely to be employed, and they earn more than those who did not continue their studies past high school. For this reason, they are the strongest contributors to the tax revenues that sustain the key programs and services provided by governments. This information needs to be highlighted in order to challenge assertions that there is already too much pressure on young Canadians to pursue post-secondary education and that access should be restricted so as not to dilute the market value of a degree. These assertions notwithstanding, the data show that while the number of post-secondary graduates has grown in recent years, the benefits of a degree in terms of more stable employment and higher earnings have not diminished.

This study investigates post-migration educational investment among newly arrived immigrants and examines the effect of post-migration education on new immigrants' labour market integration, as measured by earnings and occupational status. The results indicate that younger immigrants who are already well educated, fluent in English or French and worked in a professional or managerial occupation prior to migration are most likely to enroll in Canadian education. But, acceptance of previous work experience by Canadian employers lowers the likelihood of enrolling in further education. Financial capital was not found to affect participation in post-migration education. Those immigrants who did enroll in post-migration education enjoyed an earnings advantage and were more likely to work in a professional or managerial job. The effect of post-migration education was greater for immigrants whose previous work experience was not accepted in Canada.

The ability to understand, evaluate, and use written information (literacy), process and communicate mathematical information (numeracy), and access and use digital technology are foundational to full participation in today’s global, knowledge-based societies. This paper employs the 2012 Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) that directly assessed the cognitive skills of adults ages 16 to 65 in 24 OECD2 countries, including the United States. In this report we analyze the U.S. data on English literacy and numeracy among U.S. immigrant adults and explore how their cognitive skills—skills that are tested in English—are related to key immigrant integration outcomes such as employment, income, access to training, and health. Immigrant adults lag U.S.-born adults and account for a large share of U.S. low-skilled adults. Overall, the PIAAC results indicate that U.S. adults fared worse than most of their counterparts across the participating countries in the tested areas of proficiency (i.e., literacy, numeracy, and problem solving in technology-rich environments). The results are significant because research finds that literacy and other cognitive skills are strong predictors of income, employment, education and health and because differences in skill levels are an important source of widening income inequality. We found that immigrants lagged U.S.-born adults in terms of literacy and numeracy in English with both groups scoring below international averages. Immigrants were overrepresented among the low-skilled adults: While immigrants made up 15 percent of the total U.S. adult 16-65 population surveyed by the PIAAC, they accounted for 33 percent of adults with low literacy skills and 24 percent of those with low numeracy skills. Nonetheless we found that despite these relatively low overall scores, immigrants’ impacts on the U.S. overall scores and international standing is minimal.

This briefing, based on focus groups with visible minorities in management, supervisory and professional roles, explores barriers facing visible minorities in the workplace. It describes how visible minorities have overcome barriers to success, and it outlines their advice on how Canadian organizations might fully maximize the talents of this growing pool of labour.

Recent debates about the future of jobs have mainly focused on whether or not they are at risk of automation (Arntz et. al., 2016; Frey and Osborne, 2017; McKinsey, 2017; PwC, 2017). Studies have generally minimised the potential effects of automation on job creation, and have tended to ignore other relevant trends, including globalisation, population ageing, urbanisation, and the rise of the green economy. In this study we use a novel and comprehensive method to map out how employment is likely to change, and the implications for skills. We show both what we can expect, and where we should be uncertain. We also show likely dynamics in different parts of the labour market -- from sectors like food and health to manufacturing. We find that education, health care, and wider public sector occupations are likely to grow. We also explain why some low-skilled jobs, in fields like construction and agriculture, are less likely to suffer poor labour market outcomes than has been assumed in the past. More generally, we shine a light on the skills that are likely to be in greater demand, including interpersonal skills, higher-order cognitive skills, and systems skills. Unlike other recent studies, the method also makes it possible to predict with some confidence what kinds of new jobs may come into existence. The study challenges the false alarmism that contributes to a culture of risk aversion and holds back technology adoption, innovation, and growth; this matters particularly to countries like the US and the UK, which already face structural productivity problems (Atkinson and Wu, 2017; Shiller, 2017). Crucially, through the report, we point to the actions that educators, policymakers and individuals can take to better prepare themselves for the future.