Journal Article

Purpose- The article aims to report on research into managerial practices at the workplace level in Britain and Italy in the automobile and aerospace industries. These are examined with regard to their impact on employees' perceptions of skill, training and their relationship to participation. Are advocates of high-performance work (HPW) accurate in arguing that it can satisfy aspirations for greater employee influence in contrast to lean working? Design/methodology/approach- The methodology included questionnaires and interviews with employees and union officials in four companies – two in aerospace (one in Britain and one in Italy) and two in automotive final assembly (one in Britain and one in Italy). Findings- One of the recurrent themes to emerge from the worker interviews was that the experience of increased effort was not an inevitable outcome of the shifts in the composition of skills and tasks, but rather, a function of the workers' loss of any semblance of control over their work routines and range of responsibilities. What is distinctive about this case study analysis is that despite obvious material differences between the labour processes and working conditions of highly qualified aerospace engineers employed in HPW environments and semi‐skilled car workers employed on lean assembly lines, in two different countries, similar patterns of degradation of work were obtained. That is, technological change, such as the computerisation of design and production processes, along with various manifestations of lean staffing policies were together generating task enlargement. In micro‐political environments marked by a skewed balance of power between labour and the employer in favour of the latter, workers' autonomy had declined as had their ability to maintain some control over the pace and intensity of work. This does not sit favourably with the assumptions of those who advocate the use of “high performance work systems”. Originality/value- The paper offers an in‐depth cross-national sectoral analysis of claims that so‐called HPW significantly enhances workers' experiences of the workplace in contrast to workers' experiences of lean working environments.

Les services de paiement constituent le terrain de jeu d’une part importante des fintechs, les start-ups du secteur financier. La Commission européenne se montre attentive à leur essor, mue tant par l’intérêt immédiat des consommateurs à disposer de services financiers meilleur marché et plus innovants que par la conviction que l’harmonisation des services de paiement est un préalable à l’avènement du marché unique. Les pouvoirs publics britanniques ont donné à leurs administrés la faculté − désignée sous le vocable d’Open Banking − d’ouvrir facilement leurs données bancaires, détenues par les grandes banques britanniques, à des prestataires de services financiers tiers. La généralisation de cette pratique en Europe donne actuellement lieu à une vive bataille, dont l’issue peut infléchir sensiblement l’offre de services bancaires et amoindrir le lien existant entre les consommateurs et les banques traditionnelles.

Purpose- The aim of this article is to define a new kind of labor mobility called technological mobility, defined here as the different levels of technological change experienced by workers as they change jobs over the course of their career. Technological mobility is viewed as a form of career mobility, and it is hypothesized that moving to jobs in higher‐tech industries might prove beneficial to workers' careers irrespective of the level of education or other measures of ability. Factors that determine upward or downward technological mobility are also investigated. Design/methodology/approach- This hypothesis is tested using data from the NLSY79, a nationally representative survey of the United States, between the years 1988 and 2000. Determinants of upward and downward technological mobility are modeled using industry‐level data on technological mobility. Technological mobility is also regressed against wages to measure its impact on careers. Findings- Gender, education and local economic conditions are found to have a significant effect on technological mobility, but the effect varies depending on the way technological intensity is measured. The results also demonstrate that workers who move to high‐tech industries are indeed rewarded with higher wages, even after controlling for education levels and other known factors. Originality/value- Technological mobility as defined here is an original concept. It is shown to be an important component of overall career mobility. The article also provides an analysis of workers who are able to make the transition into higher‐tech jobs, which is a valuable addition to the research on technological change.

We live in extraordinary times, when the challenges we face may seem overwhelming, when a dark view of our common future can too easily grip our imaginations. Bigotry, racism, and xenophobia beguile easily. A fraying of social cohesion tears at the fabric of countries around the world, manifesting its worst in the form of extremism and protracted violence. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals years ago by world leaders in New York was a watershed moment in development discourse, charting a trajectory to a shared future for people and planet that breaks markedly from the damaging norms and trends of the past.

The introductory article to the special issue systematizes the main topics addressed in the special issue papers, such as the impact of technological development on the future of labor markets, changing needs in professional competencies and approaches to developing skills in demand at the level of individual, firm and regional level.

New and emerging technologies pose a serious challenge for the future of employment. As machines learn to accomplish increasingly complex production tasks, the concern arises that automation will wipe out a great number of jobs. This paper investigates the relationship between the risk posed by the automation of jobs and individual-level occupational mobility using a representative German household survey. It provides an overview of current trends and developments on the labor markets due to the automation of jobs. It also describes the most recent dynamics of self-employment and relates it to the risk of the automation of jobs. The results suggest that the expected occupational changes such as losing a job, demotion at one’s current place of employment, or starting a job in a new field are likely to be driven by the high occupation-specific risk of automation. However, the switch to self-employment, both with and without employees, is more likely to occur from paid employment in occupations with a low risk of automation. Hence, the rising level of entrepreneurial activities is less likely due to jobs becoming obsolete over the course of automation, but rather due to the high number of opportunities offered by the digital age. The issues addressed within the paper provide room for further investigation. Particularly, an important question concerns which additional skills workers in jobs with a high risk of automation should acquire in order to make themselves less susceptible to the negative consequences of such a change. More research is needed in order to develop educational strategies to make workers less susceptible to job loss due to automation.

This research synthesizes existing studies and investigates the rate and extent of potential job displacement caused by workplace automation. Using and replicating data from CB Insights, Frey and Osborne (2013), The Heritage Foundation, McKinsey Global Institute, Statista, and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, I performed analyses and made estimates regarding probability of computerization of different occupations, share of current work hours with potential for automation by 2030 in selected countries, immediate risk from automation, probability of job automation by age group, and percentage changes in labor productivity.

The poster child for the economy of the future is Uber, the much ballyhooed (and much booed) on-demand mobile service for transportation. It’s more than transportation, though. Every nook and cranny of the consumer economy is being “Uberized” by a business model that twins personal services with technology. Not only does this business model fit the competitive opportunities of today’s marketplace, but it also dovetails seamlessly with the larger dynamics shaping tomorrow’s marketplace. What’s ahead is a shift in the dominant business model, one in which all consumer goods will be available as a service and all consumer services will be available on demand. This is the Uber-All Economy of the future. As on-demand mobile services become the dominant business model, a number of other things will spin out of this transformation. Investors and entrepreneurs will focus more attention on existing assets and infrastructure. Owners of existing assets will benefit from new income streams, but less in the form of traditional rents and more in the form of shared profits from greater utilization.

By matching industry/occupation data on training to displaced worker data from the Current Population Surveys, this paper analyzes why many older workers were displaced by technological changes in the 1990s, and why these workers incurred large earnings losses. When technological changes depreciate the existing stock of firm-specific human capital, older workers who receive higher wages from the sharing arrangement of the returns to investment in firm-specific human capital are dismissed as firms find it unprofitable to retain them. These displaced workers have higher predisplacement wages with steeper wage–tenure profiles, and hence incur larger earnings losses after displacement than other displaced workers.